Google exposes Shenzhen Videostrong Technology for pre-installing system-level backdoors in 1.3 million set-top boxes and selling control to cybercriminals
2 weeks ago
Some domestic manufacturers really have no shame. Be careful when buying overseas.
Who knows whether MIIT will keep playing dead this time, or finally crack down on a typical case to salvage some face.
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IT Home, November 4 news: Google recently dismantled a large-scale botnet operation involving a company that operates both OEM (original equipment manufacturer) and ODM (original design manufacturer) businesses.
According to a blog post published by Google, Videostrong Technology Co., which had previously obtained Android TV partner certification, deliberately implanted backdoors in 1.3 million TV set-top boxes and sold related access permissions to criminal gang members. With this backdoor, attackers can install hidden software on infected devices to carry out ad fraud, build residential proxy networks, and even remotely implant malware into devices to directly attack end users.
Google said in a Google Cloud blog post: "Videostrong Technology profited by selling backdoor access to criminal gang members and loading these gangs' malware modules onto infected devices."
IT Home noted that Google also pointed out: "We found that this malware has been directly implanted into devices of multiple different brands and models for years. The related operation not only has dedicated infrastructure, but also continuously updates configurations to evade detection and manage its partner gangs. We believe this is not an isolated act arbitrarily carried out by an insider, nor a negligence during development."
In response, Google has terminated its cooperation with Videostrong Technology and banned the company from producing devices pre-installed with Google applications.
Also:
Recently, GTIG, together with the Japan National Police Agency, Lumen and other institutions, announced the dismantling of a large botnet named XCPE, involving more than 1.3 million Android TV set-top boxes and IoT devices worldwide, and cut off control of at least another 10 million infected devices by taking over downstream C2 domains.
The report pointed out that the backdoor was not the work of an insider or a development oversight, but was organized, developed, pre-installed and operated over the long term by OEM/ODM manufacturer Videostrong Technology Co. (the C2 domains disclosed in the report, http://szbboys.com, the channel identifier SZKJ, and Shenzhen Telecom IPs all point to a set-top box manufacturer in Shenzhen) for huge profits:
Bypassing detection and firmware-level persistence: Using code obfuscation to load malicious code only after first boot activation to evade Google security review; the backdoor is pre-installed in the /oem/ partition, has system privileges, automatically reinstalls after uninstallation and reboot, and even uses local privilege escalation vulnerabilities to write payloads into /system/priv-app/ and forge timestamps.
Forcible takeover and privacy theft: Tampering with system settings to forcibly disable Google Play Protect, executing arbitrary Shell commands in real time via the MQTT protocol, silently installing applications, injecting keystrokes, and even calling hidden APIs to take real-time screenshots and upload them.
"One fish, many meals" sold to the criminal underground: The manufacturer peddles backdoor access to more than ten criminal gangs, stuffing multiple monetization modules into a single device at the same time, quietly turning it into a residential proxy / PCDN node and a background ad fraud tool.
According to the disclosed technical details:
The manufacturer involved began restructuring the malware from the end of 2024 (apparently to evade previous crackdowns on the BadBox botnet), evolving into a three-tier architecture dedicated to serving criminal underground distribution:
Tier 1: Low-level persistent communication: A stub program named x.cpe (or com.oemservice) is pre-installed in the firmware /oem/ partition and has android.uid.system privileges. It is responsible for pulling configuration via AES-encrypted HTTP requests and connecting to an MQTT server (mqtt.szbboys[.]com) at IP (219.134.163.210/211) to maintain a real-time long connection.
Tier 2: Anti-sandbox loading engine: To prevent the main program from being exposed, instructions are forwarded via IPC to an external loader com.abc.nexus, which releases libseccomp_guard.so to filter system calls to counter security sandboxes and dynamic analysis. The latest variant as of August 2026 even disguises itself as system applications such as com.android.system.ntp, restarts the local adbd via libexploit.so to obtain root privileges, remounts the /system partition as read-write and implants itself, and also forges installation timestamps by modifying properties.
Tier 3: Multi-tenant criminal monetization modules: The manufacturer rents these more than 1.3 million bots as a "computing power and bandwidth bot pool" to more than ten downstream criminal groups. Not only TV set-top boxes were infected; even telemedicine devices, karaoke machines, and digital signage were not spared.
According to the report, in order to squeeze out users' bandwidth and performance, the manufacturer also implemented "resource quota management" to avoid exposure:
The report shows a JSON configuration file delivered via MQTT. In order to run multiple residential proxy SDKs (such as Linkfog/Dianxin Cloud, AppSalt/Honeygain, GaGaNode, NetNut, Traffmonetizer, etc.) and ad fraud plug-ins (such as HiddenView, Moyu, Spirit) simultaneously on a single device, the manufacturer specifically imposed system resource limits in the configuration:
Limit a single proxy module's CPU usage to no more than 70% and memory to no more than 50%, and set weights and over-limit alarms.
In other words, to ensure the criminal underground can steadily drain resources over the long term without causing the set-top box to freeze and alert users, the manufacturer directly wrote a "QoS scheduling system" for malware into the firmware.
In addition to selling bandwidth for residential proxies and silently running ads in the background, the report authors found when analyzing C2 data that operators also directly performed sensitive operations on victims' devices:
Forcibly disabling the security measure Google Play Protect;
Continuously taking screenshots and transmitting them back to the server in real time via MQTT;
Remotely injecting keystroke commands, stealing account information and system logs on devices, and opening reverse shells.
The criminal servers have now been seized, and the manufacturer and its affiliated companies have been permanently removed from the Android certification ecosystem.

The most alarming thing here isn't a single vendor's problem—it's whether certification systems can actually keep firmware layers in check. People buying cheap boxes overseas are especially likely to get burned.